Cloud Security
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Cybercrime
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Fraud Management & Cybercrime
Oracle Cloud Infrastructure Flaw Enabled Malicious File Uploads, Researchers Found

Exploring Oracle Cloud Infrastructure’s Cloud Shell capabilities, researchers found that Oracle’s tightly integrated Code Editor could be silently exploited via drive-by attacks to install malware.
See Also: On Demand | From Patch to Prevention: Modernizing Remediation Across Hybrid Environments
Vulnerability management provider Tenable on Wednesday said it discovered and reported the critical remote code execution vulnerability to Oracle, adding that it’s now been fixed and users are protected.
Even so, the discovery highlights an ongoing challenge pertaining to feature-rich, modern cloud environments, said veteran bug hunter Liv Matan, a senior security researcher at Tenable Research. “Integrations aren’t just conveniences, they’re potential points for vulnerabilities,” he said.
Widely used Oracle Cloud Infrastructure, or OCI, provides users with more than 150 cloud services, ranging from containers and storage to VMware and artificial intelligence. Thousands of businesses as well as numerous governments use OCI, including Deloitte Consulting, GE Appliances, Hewlett Packard Enterprise, Xerox and the Liaison Office of the European Parliament in Belgium, among many others.
Built into OCI is Cloud Shell, a full, browser-based Linux terminal, accessible through the Oracle Cloud Console that provides access to developer tools, including Git and Java, as well as preinstalled language runtimes.
Studying OCI, the researchers found that Cloud Shell appeared to be very well secured.
The same wasn’t true for Code Editor, which Oracle describes as being “a console-based code-editing tool that requires no infrastructure setup or installation and can be launched from anywhere within OCI console, supported services and Oracle Cloud Infrastructure Cloud Shell.” The tool includes integrations with multiple core OCI services, including Resource Manager, Functions and Data Science, as well as Git integration.
“Code Editor is often treated by researchers and users as a sandboxed, isolated space, but its deep interface with Resource Manager, Functions and Data Science suggests otherwise,” said Matan in a research report released Wednesday.
Hence the researchers investigated this simple-sounding question pertaining to Code Editor: “If a developer can upload files easily, can an attacker?”
The answer turned out to be affirmative. While Cloud Shell appeared to carefully screen any and all uploads, the browser-based Code Editor “exposed a /file-upload
endpoint that lacked cross-site request forgery – CSRF – defenses,” Matan said. “This misalignment opened the door to remote file manipulation via crafted cross-site requests.”
As the researchers demonstrated in a proof-of-concept exploit shared with Oracle, “an attacker could create a webpage that, when visited by an authenticated Oracle Cloud Infrastructure user, would upload a malicious file to their Cloud Editor without their knowledge.” Since Code Editor was built atop the Cloud Shell file system, this file upload would go directly to a victim’s Cloud Shell, allowing them to remotely execute code.
Because the Code Editor could affect the Cloud Shell file system, attackers could also exploit the flaw to reach other integrated services.
“Attackers can also tamper with files used by Resource Manager, Functions or Data Science services, all of which rely on this shared environment,” Matan said. “For instance, injecting malicious code into a deployed Function or modifying the Resource Manager workspace can lead to broader compromise across OCI services. In essence, what begins as a simple CSRF exploit targeting file uploads on Cloud Shell quickly escalates into a multi-surface threat, compromising not just the shell, but the full suite of developer tools around it.”
Oracle’s fix has been to add CSRF protection by adding a custom HTTP header named x-csrf-token
with the value csrf-value
to ensure “that only authorized, properly formed requests generated from within the authenticated Oracle Cloud environment are accepted by the server,” Matan said. “Without this header, requests are rejected, effectively mitigating the previously exploitable behavior.”
This fix safeguards against CSRF because, as Mozilla notes, “for security reasons, browsers restrict cross-origin HTTP requests initiated from scripts,” including JavaScript, meaning that a different origin cannot set custom headers, unless the target server has been set to explicitly permit this capability via cross-origin resource sharing, or CORS.
Tenable said the Oracle flaw stands as the latest in a long line of layered security problems in cloud environments. Securing cloud environments is like a game of Jenga, Tenable said, in which players remove blocks from the bottom and place them on top, aiming to not be the one who loses by sending the tower crashing down (see: Google Cloud Fix Blocks Unauthorized Container Access).
“Cloud services are like blocks,” Matan said. “If one service is compromised, the other services built on top of it inherit the risk and vulnerability.”