Endpoint Security
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Governance & Risk Management
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Hardware / Chip-level Security
Attackers Can Upload Malware in System Management Mode and Disable Secure Boot

Multiple high-severity vulnerabilities in Gigabyte’s UEFI firmware could enable attackers to execute arbitrary code within System Management Mode, granting persistent and nearly undetectable control over affected systems.
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The flaws, tracked as CVE-2025-7026 through CVE-2025-7029, resurface vulnerabilities previously identified in American Megatrends Inc. firmware and are now confirmed to affect Gigabyte products, according to coordinated disclosures by Binarly and Carnegie Mellon University”s CERT/CC.
System Management Mode is a highly privileged execution environment in x86 processors, operating below the OS in an isolated region of memory known as System Management RAM. Exploiting SMM enables adversaries to bypass OS-level protections, disable platform security features including Secure Boot and Intel BootGuard, and install stealthy firmware implants resistant to detection and removal.
These vulnerabilities enable an attacker to corrupt SMM memory and execute arbitrary code with Ring-2 privileges, said Binarly in its advisory. Binarly said the vulnerabilities enable full control of the platform, effectively undermining the integrity of the operating system and all higher-layer security tools.
The flaws center on improper validation of data passed to System Management Interrupt handlers. They include:
- CVE-2025-7029: Unchecked RBX register allows control over pointers in power/thermal configuration, leading to arbitrary writes in SMRAM.
- CVE-2025-7028: Lack of validation for function pointers enables manipulation of flash memory operations.
- CVE-2025-7027: A double pointer dereference allows memory writes based on untrusted NVRAM variables and attacker-controlled pointers.
- CVE-2025-7026: An unchecked RBX pointer in the CommandRcx0 function permits writes to attacker-specified SMRAM addresses.
Although these bugs require local or remote administrative privileges for exploitation, successful attacks can be launched from within the OS or during early boot phases, sleep states or recovery environments, well before endpoint security tools are operational.
The risk is especially severe for legacy systems, as many are no longer under active support and remain unpatched.
Gigabyte confirmed the vulnerabilities affect legacy Intel-based platforms, including the H110, Z170, Z270, Z370, Z390 and Z590 motherboard families. While newer platforms are not affected, BIOS updates are being released for currently supported models. End-of-life products will not receive automatic updates. Users must contact Gigabyte field application engineers for remediation guidance.
Users should immediately check the Gigabyte support site for updated firmware or contact their OEM for support, especially if they are operating on EOL platforms, said CERT/CC in its advisory. CERT/CC aid the vunerabilities are not theoretical issues. Exploitation can result in stealthy and persistent system compromise.
According to CERT/CC, the vulnerabilities were previously addressed by AMI in private disclosures but were found to persist in some OEM integrations like those by Gigabyte, underscoring the need for rigorous downstream firmware validation.
Binarly warned that the SMM attack surface is one of the most attractive for adversaries because of its privileged execution and invisibility to the OS. The presence of these flaws in production firmware reaffirms that better safeguards and validation practices are needed across the firmware supply chain.
Cobalt CTO Gunter Ollmann said, “Firmware vulnerabilities like these represent a nightmare scenario – persistent, hard-to-detect control that bypasses virtually all OS-level defenses. It’s the ultimate ”ghost in the machine” scenario: compromise at the hardware layer that operates below the OS’s visibility and exploits a space inherently trusted by the system. This evolution in attacker tactics reinforces the need for security testing that spans every layer of the stack. Organizations should incorporate firmware-level targets into their pentesting programs and ensure their red teams have the expertise to probe the deepest layers of system architecture,” Cobalt CTO Gunter Ollmann said.
Organizations are urged to deploy updated BIOS versions as soon as they become available and consider transitioning from unsupported legacy hardware. Regular firmware assessments and vendor coordination are critical components of a robust hardware security strategy.